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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case was filed as an appeal, pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, LC. 
§ 67-5201 et seq., from a "Final Order" of the Idaho Department of Lands (DL). The subject Order 
was entered following a coiisolidated contested case hearing on separate applications for single- 
family docks (made pursuant to the Lake Protection Act, LC. § 58-1301 et seq.) that were filed by 
Lake CDA Investments and Chris Keenan (the Respondents). 
The Respondents' properties are traversed by a right-of-way easement for the benefit of the 
State. That right-of-way is administered by ITD. ITD objected to the applications, claiming that the 
Respondents' properties were divested of littoral rights (and hence, the right of wharfage) by virtue 
of ITD's right-of-way easement. Following the consolidated contested case hearing, IDL agreed and 
entered its order denying the requested encroachment permits. 
Respondents timely appealed IDL's Order to the Kootenai County District Court. Those 
appeals were consolidated. ITD thereafter intervened. Following briefing and argument, the District 
Court entered its "Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal." After finding that IDL's decision 
found "no support in the law," the District Court vacated IDL's order and remanded the matter for 
further consistent proceedings. Pursuant to LC. 512-1 17, the District Court thereafter granted the 
Respondents' request for an award of attorney fees and costs. ITD and IDL timely appealed from 
the District Court. Those appeals have been consolidated by order of this Court.' 
1 For purposes of this Brief, the following acronyms will be used to refer to matters of 
record. First, the acronym "CR" will be used to refer to the two (2) volumes of the Clerk's Record 
on Appeal (which include matters on file with the Kootenai County District Court subsequent to the 
filing of the Respondents' separate "Petitions for Review" under IDAPA). Second, the acronym 
"Tr." will be used to refer to the "Transcript on Appeal" before the District Court. Third, the 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
1. The Lake CDA Investments Encroachment Permit Application. 
Lake CDA Investments owns Lot 3 of Carrs' Marina View Estates in Kootenai 
County. AR, p. 17. At the time Lake CDA Investments applied to IDL for an encroachment permit, 
its two adjacent littoral neighbors were Thomas Hudson (hereafter "Hudson") and Rick Carr. AR, 
pp. 17-22. The Lake CDA Investments, Hudson, and Carr properties are all contiguous littoral 
properties located waterward of an expanse of former Interstate 90 lying east of the City of Coeur 
d7Alene (the roadway is now known as "Coeur d7Alene Lake Drive"). 
Lake CDA Investments applied for a non-commercial etlcroachment permit authorizing the 
installation of a single-family dock on its littoral property. AR at pp. 17-22. The application was 
dated July 31,2006 and received by IDL on August 2,2006. AR at p. 24. 
LC. 5 58-1305(a) provides: 
Applications for construction . . . of navigational encroachments not 
extending beyond the line of navigability nor intended primarily for 
commercial use shall he processed by the Board with the minimum 
of procedural requirements and shall not be denied nor appearance 
required except in the most unusual circumstances or if the vrovosed 
encroachment infrin~es upon or it appears it may infringe upon the 
riparian or littoral rights of an adjacent propertv owner. 
See LC. 5 58-1305(a) (emphasis added). 
-
LC. 5 58-1305(c) provides: 
In the event objection to the application is filed by an adjacent owner 
. . . the Board &aJ fix a time, no later than sixty (60) days &om the 
acronym "AR" will be used to refer to the initial "Agency Record" lodged with the District Court 
by D L .  Fourth, the acronym "Amended AR" will be used to refer to the "Amended Agency Record" 
lodged with the District Court by IDL. Finally, included in the "Amended Agency Record," at 
Document 16, is a transcript of proceedings related to the contested case hearing held before DL.  
2 
date of filing application, and aplace, for affording the applicant and 
adjacent owner filing objection to appear and present evidence in 
support of or in opposition to the application and within forty-five 
(45) days thereafter shall render a decision . . . . 
See LC. $ 58-1305(c) (emphasis added). 
-
IDL provided notice of Lake CDA Investments' application to Carr, Hudson, the Idaho 
Department of Transportation (ITD). AR at pp. 46-48. ITD owned no adjacent property with littoral 
rights that would otherwise have qualified ITD for notice under LC. 5 58-1305(b). Carr advised IDL 
that he did not object. AR at p. 49. The Hudsons advised IDL that they objected (notwithstanding 
the fact that they themselves had previously made a successful application for a private 
encroachment (dock) on their adjacent littoral property). AR at pp. 50-5 1. ITD also objected to Lake 
CDA Investments' application. AR at p. 53. However, ITD's objection was clearly untimely in that 
it was made at least twenty-four (24) days after the September 16,2006 due date. AR at pp. 46,53. 
See also LC. $ 58-1305(b). 
--
Notwithstanding the untimeliness ofDOT's objection, andnotwithstanding the clear mandate 
of LC. $ 58-1305(c) (requiring a hearing on a timely objection (the Hudson objection)), IDL 
unilaterally denied Lake CDA Investments' application. AR at p. 56. Lake CDA Investments then 
filed its initial Petition for Review on November 22,2006. CR, Vol. I, pp. 1-13. That Petition was 
assigned Kootenai County Case No. CV-06-8728. 
The fact that IDL had acted in derogation of Lake CDA Investments' rights to due process 
and the statutoryprotections set forth in the Lake Protection Act (LPA) at LC. $58-1305 were clear. 
Accordingly, IDL stipulated to stay the appeal before the District Court so as to allow for further 
administrative proceedings compliant with the requirements of the LPA. 
2. Keenan's Lake Encroachment Permit Application. 
On November 17,2006, Chris Keenan (Keenan) made application pursuant to the 
LPA for anon-commercial navigational encroachment (a single-family dock). Amended AR at Ex. 
25, p. 170. Keenan had acquired Lot 2 of Carrs' Marina View Estates. Id. Keenan's littoral lot was 
bounded by the Lake CDA Investments' lot (Lot 3) and a lot owned by Rick and Jan Can (Lot 1). 
Lake CDA Investments and Carr, as the two adjacent littoral owners to Keenan, consented 
to the application. There is no record evidence of any objection having been interposed, timely or 
otherwise, to the Keenan application by any adjacent littoral owner. Further, there is no record 
evidence of any objection having been interposed, timely or otherwise, by ITD.' 
On January 24,2007, IDL entered an "Order for Contested Case Hearing," together with a 
"Notice of Appointment of Hearing Officer." AR at pp. 75-78. IDL gave notice of the appointment 
of D L  employee Jim Brady to conduct a contested case hearing and to develop a recommendation 
to be made to IDL's Director. Id. For purposes of the hearings, IDL consolidated the Lake CDA 
Investments' application (given that the judicial appeal had been stayed so as to facilitate 
administrative proceedings) with the Keenan application (to which timely or recorded objection 
had been interposed by either an owner of an adjacent littoral property or ITD). 
2 The Hearing Examiner referenced a January 8, 2007 letter from ITD to D L  
recommending denial of the Keenan's application. CR, Vol. I, p. 26. However, this document was 
not included in the administrative record. The document was proffered into the record on appeal, 
without an accompanying motion to augment, by ITD's counsel. CR, Vol. 11, pp. 145-149. In the 
referenced objection, ITD states that as to Keenan, "there may not be a riparian right remaining on 
the five acre parcel subdivided and ... sold to Mr. [sic] Keenan." In any event, ITD's objection was 
untimely under LC. $58-1305(b). The objection was received more than ten (10) days from the date 
of the application (which, under $58-1305(b), "shall be deemed sufficient notice if the adjacent 
owner is the State of Idaho"). 
3. Administrative Proceedings Before IDL. 
On March 30, 2007, IDL held a contested case hearing on the consolidated Lake CDA 
Investments and Keeiian applications. AR at p. 145. Testimony was taken of Jan Carr, Rick Carr, 
Thomas Hudson, and Dirk Roeller (a professional land surveyor employed by ITD). The parties 
additionally submitted written briefing and exhibits were introduced and received in the record. 
On May 18, 2007, Hearing Officer Brady issued his recommended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of AR at pp. 142-54. Brady recommended that both requested encroachment permits 
be denied. Td. On May 21,2007, IDLDirector George Bacon entered aFinal Order adopting Brady's 
recommendations. Id. at pp. 155-57. 
4. Subsequent Proceedings. 
On June 7,2007, Lake CDA Investments filed a First Amended Petition for Review 
(in Kootenai County Case No. CV-06-8728), seeking appellatereview, pursuant to IDAPA, of DL'S 
May 21,2007 Final Order denying its requested permit. CR, Vol. I, p. 14. On the same day, Keenan 
separately filed her Petition for Review from the same Order. That Petition was assigned Kootenai 
County Case No. CV-07-4069. 
ITD subsequently moved to intervene. By Order entered July 10,2007, the Court authorized 
ITD's requested intervention. CR, Vol. I, p. 45. By subsequent Order, entered August 7,2007, the 
two pending appeals were consolidated. CR, Vol. I, p. 50. 
Following briefing and argument, the Court entered its "Memoraiidum Decision and Order 
on Appeal," finding that IDL's denial of the requested permits was unsupported in law. CR., Vol. 
11, pp. 299-335. The Court subsequently entered monetaryjudgments in favor of the Respondents, 
and against ITD and D L ,  awarding attorney fees under LC. $12-117 for the fees incurred by 
Respondents on appeal. CR, Vol. II, pp. 418-30. Both ITD and IDL have timely appealed to this 
Court. 
C. Statement of Pacts. 
1. General Overview of Area in Question. 
This appeal relates to two (2) separate applications for single family docks made by two 
adjacent littoral property owners, Respondents Lake CDA Investments and Keenan. In order to 
acquaint the Court with the relationship of the Respondents' separate properties, and the general 
geographic area encompassing the same, certain materials have been excerpted in the Addendum to 
this Brief. Those materials are discussed more fully below for the Court's convenience. 
Attached hereto for illustrative purposes, as Addendum No. 1, is an aerial photograph 
showing the location of the three (3) parcels created by the Carrs' Marina View Estates Plat. 
Amended AR, Ex. 10, pp. 130-32 (Carr's Marinaview Estates Plat). These parcels include the Lake 
CDA Investments parcel (Lot 3) and the Keenan parcel (Lot 2). The same plat also created Lot 1. 
Lot 1 is owned by Rick and Jan Carr. Lot 1 has an existing dock that dates back nearly seventy (70) 
years and which will be discussed more fully below in the context of Clyde Stranahan (the individual 
who sold the entire parcel to the Carrs who in turn then recorded the plat, creating Lots 1,2, and 3). 
AddendumNo. 1 shows the relationship between the Lake CDA Investments' lot (Lot 3) and 
the adjacent littoral property (owned by the Hudsons). Addendum No. 1 further shows the 
relationship between the Carrlstranahanproperty (Lot 1) andits adjacent littoral neighbor, theBeach 
House MarinaISilver Beach pr~perty .~ 
3 AddendumNo. 1, in the precise form attached hereto, was not included as an actual 
exhibit in the Administrative Record. However, it is offered herein purely for illustrative purposes 
to acquaint the Court with the area in question. The matters depicted on Addendum No. 1 are a 
Addendum No. 2 consists of an aerial photograph that shows a wider view of the matters 
depicted in Addendum No. 1. Amended AR, Ex. 9, p. 128 (aerial photograph). Depicted in the 
photograph is the Beach House Marina and the existing encroachment on the CmlStranahan 
property (Lot 1 of Carrs' Marina View Estates). This encroachment can be seen as the red-covered 
boat slip lying slightly southeast of the Beach House Marina. Also depicted is the expanse of 
property between the Cardstranahan parcel (Lot 1) and the Hudson parcel. This expanse includes 
the properties giving rise to this proceeding (Lot 2 (Keenan) and Lot 3 (Lake CDA Investments)). 
Addendum No. 3 is an additional aerial photograph, with a more expansive view than the 
photographs included as Addendum No. 1 and 2. Amended AR, Ex. A, p. 5. Addendum No. 3 
shows the area of shoreline from the Beach House Marina to and including Bennett Bay. Along this 
strip, as shown in Addendum No. 3, are multiple private encroachments (docks) extending 
waterward of Lake Coeur d'Alene Drive (former Interstate 90). Including the dock on the 
CardStranahan property (Lot 1) and the dock on the Hudson property (adjacent to the Lake CDA 
Investments lot (Lot 3)), there are thirty (30) separate private docks currently in existence between 
the CmIStranahan property and Bennett Bay. Amended AR 16 at pp. 46-47. 
Addendum No. 4 i s  a copy of a 1967 photograph. Amended A , ,  Ex. 26, p. 183. See also 
Amended AR 16 at pp. 39-40. Depicted in the background of the photograph is Potlatch Hill. 
Amended AR 16 at p. 26. The shoreline depicted includes the present location of a portion of the 
Beach House property and Lots 1 (Can), 2 (Keenan), and 3 (Lake CDA Investments) of Carrs' 
Marina View Estates. a. at pp. 25-27. 
distillation of matters appearing on other exhibits, including but not limited to Addenda Nos. 2-6 to 
this Brief, and represent approximations of the locations of the properties discussed in this Brief. 
Also included as Addendum No. 5 is a contemporary photograph of the same area depicted 
in Exhibit 26. Amended AR, Ex. 26, p. 183. The photograph included as Addendum No. 5 (Ex. 27) 
was taken approximately one week prior to the March 2007 contested case hearing date. Amended 
AR 16 at p. 27. The photograph shows the pilings utilized by the Cadstranahan dock (also depicted 
in Addenda Nos. 1 and 2). Also depicted in the foreground are encroachments associated with the 
Hudsons' dock. Amended AR 16 at pp. 27-28. Depicted in the background is a post- 1967 bulkhead 
constructed on the Beach House side of Coeur d'Alene Lake Drive. 
Finally, attached as Addendum No. 6 is a copy of the first page of the Carrs' Marina View 
Estates Plat. Amended AR, Ex. 10, p. 130. The plat shows the three lots created from the original 
CarrJStranahan parcel. These include Lot 1 (Carr), Lot 2 (Keenan), and Lot 3 (Lake CDA 
Investments). The Hudson parcel lies south of the southwest comer of Lot 3. 
2. Prior IDT Policy Re: Right-of-way Easements and Retained Littoral 
Rights. 
ITD's interest in the properties of Lake CDA Investments and Keenan is in the nature of a 
an easement. ITD's rights derive from a series of recorded instruments beginning in 191 1 and ending 
in 1940. Amended AR at Exs. 2,3, and 4, pp. 110-1 19. The last instrument (Ex. 4) was granted by 
the Respondents' predecessors-in-title (Vera and Jack Smith) and is captioned "Right-of-way Deed." 
As previously acknowledged by ITD, this instrument, predating March 4, 1953, conveys rights in 
the nature of an easement rather than a fee interest: 
I wish to point out that ITD is not asserting title to the subject right- 
of-way. Until March 4, 1953, Idaho Code 3 39-301 stated that by 
taking or accepting land for a highway, the public acquired only a 
right-of-way and not fee simple. This law was changed in 1953 to 
establish that the State acquires fee simple when it acquires land for 
a right-of-way. 1953 Idaho Sess. Laws, Chapter 100. Since the right- 
of-way was granted in 1941, while the former Idaho Code 5 39-301 
was in effect, ITD makes no claim to title. 
AR at pp. 15-16. 
ITD, in years prior, candidly admitted that which it will not concede here: access rights 
acquired under apre-1953 right-of-way easement do not include littoral rights, which are otherwise 
retained by the hurdenedproperty owner. In 1995, ITD's then-District Engineer, ToinBaker, advised 
IDL, with specific reference to docks on the Silver Beach area (the same area in question here), as 
follows: 
In reference to our recent discussions, the Department [ITD] has no 
objection to Idaho Department of Lands issuing dock permits on this 
section of roadway for those private properties where there is 
evidence that the property lines originally extended to the lakeshore 
and riparian rights exist. These are properties across which the [sic] 
ITD now holds an easement for the old Highway. 
Our records and plans indicate that the Transportation Department 
has jurisdiction over a fifty-foot corridor which is twenty-five feet on 
each side of a described centerline. This corridor is the area the 
Department maintains. Land lying beyond twenty-five feet from 
centerline is considered beyond our jurisdiction. 
It is possible that the land beyond twenty-five feet from centerline has 
fill material on it belonging to the7~ighway Department. This 
material may have been placed there by years of maintenance work 
. - 
or, more than likely, by agreement at the time of construction. It is 
common for our Department to obtain temporary easements for the 
constructionof slopes. Those temporary easements are written so they 
are no longer in effect when construction is complete. The easements 
do not encumber the title to the underlying laid. The owner of the 
land has all rights when the construction work is completed as they 
did previously. 
Whateverthe situationmaybe, and irrespective ofthe high water line, 
our Depatment can only claim jurisdiction over twenty-five feet each 
side of the existing centerline for construction or maintenance work. 
If we should have need to go beyond the twenty-five foot line, then 
necessary rights to do so would have to be acquired. . . . 
CR, Vol. I, pp. 115-1 16. Respondent sought to bring the referenced position statement of ITD to 
the Court's attention through a "Motion to Take Additional Evidence." CR, Vol. I, pp. 117-1 18. 
The District Court denied Respondents' motion. Tr., pp. 10-12. For reasons set forth herein, the 
District Court's refusal to consider the Baker correspondence, although not essential to the District 
Court's ultimate decision, was in error. 
3. Historical Pacts Regarding the Retained Littoral Rights On the 
Petitioners' Properties. 
The present-day Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina, Lake CDA Investments, Iceenan, and 
Hudsonproperties, all ostensibly fronting on Lake Coeur d' Alene and possessing littoral rights, were 
carved from the same "parent parcel," i.e., Government Lot 2. As this Court is aware, government 
lots were utilized by the General Land Office for purposes ofmeasuring the upland quantity (acreage 
size) of waterfront parcels as the same did not fit "neatly" into the traditional "section" method of 
surveying that was otherwise utilized for non-littoral properties. The very use of the term 
"government lotnimplies littoral rights when the lot is adjacent to a ~ a t e r w a y . ~  
4 As previously noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals: 
Govemment lots are portions of square-mile sections surveyed and established by the 
United States Government because they do not conform to the ordinary standards for 
quarter-quarter sections. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, MANUAL 
OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC LANDS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 53-79 (1973). &generally F. CLARK, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF SURVEYING AND BOUNDARIES, Ch. 11 (J. Grimes 4~ ed. (1976)). 
Such fractional sections often are remainders or oversized areas resulting from laying 
a flat grid system upon a round planet. In other cases they result where section lines 
lienear bodies ofwater. There, fractional lots are created so boundaries lie along and 
follow the curves the shoreline, thus providing as many lots as practical with 
substantial water frontage. F. CLARK, m a  5214. 
Turning to the properties at issue, inMay of 1895, the present-dayBeachHouseISilver Beach 
Marina property was conveyed f?om the original Government Lot 2 "parent parcel" by Mr. and Mrs. 
W. S. Goodwin. Amended ARat Ex. 5, pp. 120-21. Theproperty conveyedwas described as littoral 
property, fronting on Lake Coeur d'Alene (e.g., "to the Lakeshore"). Id. This property is referred 
to herein as "the Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina property." 
Two years later, in 1897, Mr. and Mrs. Goodwin conveyed from their remaining portion of 
Government Lot 2 property that includes the present-day Lake CDA Investments, Keenan, and 
Hudson properties. Amended AR at Ex. 1, pp. 108-09. As with the Beach HouseISilver Beach 
Marina conveyance two years earlier, the 1897 Goodwin conveyance acknowledged the littoral 
nature of the property (which includes the present-day properties of the Respondents). The property 
was described as "including all riparian rights." Id.5 
In June of 1911, the then-owner of the parcel that the Goodwins had conveyed in 1897 
(Armstrong) and Kootenai County entered into a certain Agreement. Amended AR at Ex. 3, pp. 1 14- 
15. Pursuant to the terms of that Agreement, the parties acknowledged that the property then titled 
in the name of Armstrong (which includes the present-day Lake CDA Investments, Keenan, and 
Hudson properties) included "all riparian rights." Id. Through the Agreement of 191 1, Armstrong 
granted Kootenai County aninety-nine (99) year easement for a sixteen (16) foot wide right-of-way. 
Id. In consideration for the rights granted under the Agreement, the County agreed to construct "a 
-
substantial wire fence" between the road right-of-way and the Lake, across the remainder of the 
Currie v. Walkinshaw, 113 Idaho 586,590,746 P.2d 1045 (Ct. App. 1987). 
5 Technically speaking, "riparian" refers to rights ofproperties fronting on rivers and "littoral" 
refers to rights of properties fronting on lakes. However, they are often used interchangeably. 
Armstrongs' property, "running in a southerly direction into the water of Lake Coeur d' Alene." Id. 
No littoral rights were conveyed or encumbered as apart ofthe Agreement. The fact that the property 
was littoral, and that the Armstrongs retained those littoral rights, was confirmed by the County's 
undertaking to build a fence waterward of the right-of-way, extending into the Lake. Id. 
In 1925, Armstrong, still holding title to the present-day Lake CDA 
Investments/Keenan/I-Iudson properties, entered into another Agreement with Kootenai County, to 
expand the 191 1 right-of-way. Amended AR at Ex. 3, pp. 114-15. As with the 191 1 Agreement, 
Armstrong did not convey any littoral rights. Further, as with the 191 1 Agreement, Kootenai County 
agreed to construct "a substantial fence" between the expanded right-of-way and Lake Coeur 
d'Alene, again confirming the littoral nature of the property retained by Armstrong. Id. 
By 1940, Vera and Jack Smith had succeeded to the Armstrong property. Amended AR at 
Ex. 4, pp. 116-19. The Smiths entered into a subsequent Agreement with Kootenai County which 
expanded the right-of-way a second time. Id. The littoral rights acknowledged under the 191 1 and 
1925 Agreements (Exs. 2 and 3) were not specifically conveyed. & Those rights remained in the 
possession of the fee owner (Smith) of the burdened property. 
AR-er Smith granted the County the right-of-way easement of 1940 (Ex. 4), improvements 
were put in by ITD or its predecessor. ITD caused to be prepared drawings in the nature of "as- 
builts," which were dated by DOT testimony as having been prepared some time between 1945 and 
1950. Amended AR at 16, pp. 178-1 81; Ex. S, p. 44. Those as-built drawings, depicting the 
improvements across the Lake CDA Investments/Keenan/Hudson properties, as completed, show 
a "Boat dock" directly in front of the Canproperty (Lot 1 of Cans' Marina View Estates). They also 
show a "Boat dock" in front of the Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina property. Id. In other words, 
ITD knew that the property encompassed by "Carrs' Marina View Estates9'retained the littoral rights 
associated therewith, following delivery of the 1940 Right-of-way Deed (Ex. 4), as ITD installed 
the improvements ostensibly authorized thereunder and then prepared a set of as-built drawings 
showing the location of a boat dock that remained in front of the property that was burdened by the 
easement? 
4. Subsequent Events Confirm the Retained Littoral Rights of Properties 
Within Government Lot 2. 
a. The "Carrs' Marina View Estates" Property. 
The boat dock depicted in ITD's 1945-50 "as built" drawings thereafter remained in place. 
Clyde Stranahan succeeded to the Smith's title in the property constituting the present Carrskake 
CDA InvestmentsKeenan properties (Carrs' Marina View Estates). In 1977, following adoption of 
the Lake Protection Act (LPA), Stranahan made application to IDL to install a new dock in front of 
the present-day Can property (Lot 1). Amended AR at pp. 187-91. Inhis application fromDecember 
of 1977, Stranahan stated that he had originally installed his dock in 1958 (prior to the LPA) and that 
he was seeking approval to replace the same. Id. D L  did not question Stranahan's littoral rights and 
issued him the requested permit. Id. ITD did not object. 
The Cans ultimately succeeded to Stranahan's title to the property, which they ultimately 
platted as Cans' Marina View Estates. In March of 2004, the Carrs made application to D L  for 
permission to replace the Stranahan dock, which had arguably remained in place for at least sixty 
(60) years, if not more. Amended AR at pp. 203-15. ITD made no objection. Cans' adjacent littoral 
6 Attached as Addendum No. 7 is a copy of an excerpt of Exhibit S. This excerpt 
shows the "boat dock" in front of the present-day Can property (Lot 1 of Carrs' Marina View 
Estates) following constraction of the improvements authorized under the right-of-way easement 
granted the County by Jack and Vera Smith in 1940. 
13 
owners, including Hagadone Hospitality as the owner of the Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina, 
consented. Id. The requestedpermit was issued. This constitutes ade  facto acknowledgment that the 
property later platted as Carrs' Marina View Estates @om which the Can parcel was carved (Lot 
1)) was vested with littoral rights that survived the granting of the 1940 Right-of-way Deed 
(Amended AR at Ex. 4). 
b. The Beach House/Silver Beach Marina Property. 
Tn 1982, proceedings were pending in the Kootenai County District Court between Kenneth 
and Betty Carlsted, as Plaintiffs, and the State of Idaho as Defendants. Amended AR at Ex. 6. The 
Carlsteds succeeded to that portion of Government Lot 2 which had been conveyed by the original 
owners thereof (Goodwin) in 1897. Amended AR at Ex. 1. The property is the present site of the 
Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina. Amended AR at Ex. 7. 
The litigation between the Carlsteds and the State of Idaho resulted in the entry of a stipulated 
judgment in favor of the Carlsteds which quieted title in their name to "all riparianrights" associated 
with the Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina property. Amended AR at Ex. 6. This is further 
collfirmed by a 1986 survey received as Ex. 7.7 
7 Curiously, the D L  Hearing Examiner offered the following observation as to the referenced 
Judgment: "[Tlhe plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence and history to definitely tie the Beach House 
Marina property and the property in question." AR at pp. 15 1-52. The Hearing Examiner's conclusion 
was wholly refuted by the record evidence. Had the Hearing Examiner read and understood the exhibits, as 
described by witness testimony, the cited conclusion would have been different. Specifically, one can "tie" 
the legal description to the Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina property from the 1897 Deed (Amended AR, 
Ex. 1, pp. 108-09) to the description contained in the Judgment in Kootenai County Case No. 50700 
(Amended AR, Ex. 6, pp. 122-24). The original Deed conveying the title (Ex. I) acknowledged the littoral 
nature of the property. The State of Idaho stipulated as much in the Judgment (Ex. 6). The recorded survey 
that followed specifically made reference of the Judgment on the visual depiction of the Beach HouseISilver 
Beach Marina property. Specifically, the survey, on the actual Beach HouselSilver Beach Marina property, 
as visually depicted, contains the following notation: 
FOR OWNERSHIP OF BEACH FRONTAGE AND RIPARIAN RIGHTS SEE 
The fact that the Beach HouseJSilver Beach Marina property retained littoral rights is self- 
evident from the photographic exhibits submitted by the Respondents. For example, the exhibits 
which are produced herewith to the Addendum to this Opening Brief contain contemporaneous 
photograph showing the subject marina and the panoply of encroachments, docks, gangways, and 
pilings associated with the same. The marina and dock system would not otherwise be possible if 
the Beach HouseJSilver Beach Marina property was not "littoral" in nature. 
e. The Hudson Property. 
The Hudson property was also carved from the Goodwins' original "parent parcel" in 
Government Lot 2. In 1922, the present-day Hudson parcel was platted as Lot 1 of the "First 
Addition to Silver Beach Park." Amended AR at Ex. 11, p. 132. Consistent with the littoral rights 
attributed to the Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina, Cadstranahan, Lake CDA Investments, and 
Keenan properties, the Hudson property was depicted as extending to the shore of Lake Coeur 
d'Alene, waterward of the right-of-way then in existence. 
In August of 2005, the Hudsons applied for a single-family dock on the waters of Lake Coeur 
d'Alene adjacent to the Hudson property. Amended AR at Ex. 13, p. 135. Although the parties 
entitled to notice of a single-family encroachment permit application are deemed to be the two 
adjacent littoral owners, D L  saw fit to notify ITD of the Hudson application. Amended AR at Ex. 
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& Amended AR, Ex. 7, p. 125. The copy of the Judgment offered by the Petitioners' exhibit (Ex. 6)  
contains the same recording information. 
8 Petitioners also submitted the Affidavit of Don Holom, a professional title officer with 
twenty-eight (28) years of experience. AR at pp. 11 1-15. Mr. Holom testified that the present-day Hudson 
property was originally part of Government Lot 2, which formed the ''parent" parcel for the Beach 
HouseISilver Beach Marina, Cadstranahan, Lake CDA Investments, and Keenan parcels. Id. 
14, p. 144. ITD objected, claiming: 
The high-water line lies inside of ITD right-of-way where riparian 
rights exist. This point is confirmed with the fill that was placed 
between the normal summer pool and the roadbed. Therefore, ITD 
does not support the building of this dock. 
Amended AR at Ex. 15, p. 145. Notwithstanding ITD's objection, and implicitly finding no merit 
therein, IDL determined that the Hudsons in fact owned littoral rights and issued the requested 
permit. This constituted another de facto determination that the Respondents' properties possess 
littoral rights since those properties, like the Hudsonproperty, were derived from the same "parent" 
parcel (Government Lot 2). There is no functional difference between the Hudson application, on 
the one hand, and the Respondents' applications, on the other hand. In fact, Lake CDA Investments' 
application was submitted to IDL in July of 2006, but four (4) months after IDL granted the Hudson 
permit. Certainly the law did not change in that intervening period of time. The applications are 
legally and factually indistinguishable. The Hudsons have since installed their dock and continue to 
enjoy the same. Meanwhile, the Respondents have remained enmeshed in proceedings for three years 
while they await approval of an encroachment that was to be granted under the LPA "with a 
minimum of difficulty." 
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
ITD and IDL, through their separate Opening Briefs, have adequately framed the general 
parameters of the overlapping issues subsumed by the Appellants' consolidatedappeals. In addition, 
pursuant to IAR 35(b)(4), Respondents raise the following additional issue on appeal: 
1. Whether Respondents are entitled to an award ofreasonable attorney fees and 
costs, as incurred on appeal, pursuant to LC. $12-1 17? 
2. Whether ITD lacked standing to object to the requested encroachments? 
3. Whether ITD failed to timely object? 
4. Whether ITD and IDL are estopped to deny that the Respondents' properties 
possess littoral rights? 
111. ARGUMENT. 
A. Standard of Review. 
In its Opening Brief, ITD has set forth its contention of the applicable standard of review in 
an appeal from a District Court's Decision (itself sitting in its appellate capacity) on a petition for 
review from an agency determination pursuant to IDAPA (I.C. 567-5279): 
Given the logic expressed by this Court in Losser v. Bradstreet, [I45 Idaho 
670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)], the appropriate standard of review in the instant case 
would appear to be a review of the District Court decision in light of the criteria set 
forth in LC. 567-5279. Adopting that standard of review would put to rest what 
appears to be a discrepancy regarding the standard applied to a review of a District 
Court decision when it is sitting in an appellate capacity from an agency decision. 
Regardless of the standard of review applied, an "agency's factual 
detenninations are binding upon [an appellate court] even when there is conflicting 
evidence, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent 
evidence in the record.". . . . 
See ITD's Opening Brief at pp. 16-17. 
-
B. The Factual Evidence of Record Irrefutably Establishes that the 1940 Right-of- 
Way Deed that Encumbers the Respondents' Properties Was Not Intended to 
Abrogate the Respondents' Retained Littoral Rights. 
As discussed more fully above, in Respondents' "Statement of Facts," all three lots created 
by the Carrs' Marina View Estates Plat, together with the adjacent Hudson lot and the adjacent 
Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina property, were part of an original government lot (Government 
Lot 2) which possessed littoral rights. The Hearing Examiner agreed. CR, Vol. I, p. 32. In fact, the 
Hearing Examiner agreed that those littoral rights remained apart of all ofthe effected and described 
properties tluough 1940. a, 
In 1940, the Respondents' predecessors-in-title (Vera and Jack Smith) granted Kootenai 
County an easement of apredetennined width, measured from the centerline of the mad described 
in the instrument. Amended AR at Ex. 4, p. 116. At the contested case hearing, Dirk Roeller, PLS, 
on behalf of ITD, agreed that the road construction authorized by the 1940 Smith right-of-way Deed 
extended waterward of the authorized area as described in the easement: 
Q. There is fill placed between the level of the lake today, contemporary lake 
level today, and the lakeward boundary of that right-of-way, as described in 
the Instrument [the 1940 Right-of-way Deed]? 
A. ~ b u  know, the answer to that question is a good one. The answer is yes .... 
Q. And thereby creating a barrier between the watenvard portion of the subject 
property and -- now essentially you've landlocked the waterward portion of 
the subject property? 
A. That's probably a very good way to describe it, yes. 
Amended AR at 16, pp. 192-93.9 
Notwithstanding the effective "landlocking" of the subject littoral parcel, the State, well 
before the institution of these proceedings, acknowledged the retained littoral rights of the 
Respondents' predecessors notwithstanding the improvements accomplished by the State over and 
outside the described easement area. Specifically, sometime between 1945 and 1950, after installing 
the improvements across theRespondents7 properties as authorized by the 1940Right-of-Way Deed, 
the State prepared drawings in the nature of "as-builts." Amended AR at Ex. S, p. 44. An excerpt 
9 Incredibly, D L  claims that the Respondents' "predecessors-in-interest expressly 
consented to having their shoreline filled in order to accommodate the highway." See DL'S 
Opening Brief at p. 32. There is= evidence that the Respondents' predecessors consented to allow 
the State to go outside of the specifically defined easement area if the intention was to usurp the 
underlying littoral rights. 
of Exhibit "S" is included as Addendum No. 7 to this Brief. See also Amended AR at 16, pp. 178- 
81. Those as-built drawings, depicting the improvements across from the Respondents' properties, 
as completed, show a "boat dock" in the area that includes Government Lot 2. Obviously, if the 
State believed that it had somehow usurped, acquired, or subordinated the littoral rights of the 
Respondents' predecessors through delivery of the 1940 Right-of-way Deed, it wouldnot have then 
completed those improvements and, through the "as-built" drawings, depicted a "boat dock" 
extending waterward from the same. Curiously, neither ITD nor IDL devote much discussion in 
their 84 collective pages of briefing to Exhibit S. 
If there was any doubt that ITD (and D L  for that matter) acknowledged the retained littoral 
rights of the Respondents' properties, following completion of the improvements and the preparation 
of Exhibit "S," then the events of the years that followed only served to dispel such doubt. 
Specifically, Clyde Stranahan thereafter succeeded to the Smiths' title in the Respondents' 
properties. In 1977, following adoption of the LPA, Stranahan applied to D L  to install a new dock 
in front of the Respondents' properties. Amended AR, pp. 187-91. In his application, Stranahan 
stated that he had originally installed his dock at the same location in 1958. Id. He was seeking 
approval to replace the same given the intervening adoption of the LPA in 1974. Id. Neither IDL 
nor ITD questioned Stranahan's littoral rights and the requested permit was duly issued. Id. 
The Carrs ultimately succeeded to Stranahan's title. Before platting the Stranahan property 
into three lots (through the Carrs' Marina View Estates Plat (Addendum No. 6)), the Cam made 
application to D L  to replace the Stranahan dock. Neither IDLnor ITD questioned the Carrs' littoral 
rights and the requested permit was issued. 
The approvals given for the Stranahan and Carr encroachments werenot isolated occurrences. 
Other portions of the same parent parcel (Government Lot 2) were granted encroachment permits 
by DL,  with no objection being interposed by ITD. In August of 2005, the Hudsons (who owned 
the property immediately adjacent to the south border of the property platted by the Carrs) applied 
for a single-family dock. Amended AR at Ex. 13, p. 135. Although ITD owned no adjacent littoral 
property (sufficient to confer standing to object under I.C. $58-1305(b)), ITD nonetheless objected 
to the application, claiming: 
The high-water line lies inside of ITD right-of-way where riparian rights exist. This 
point is confirmed with the fill that was placed between the normal summer pool and 
the roadbed. Therefore, ITD does not support the building of this dock. 
Amended AR at Ex. 15, p. 145. Notwithstanding ITD's objection, and implicitly finding no merit 
therein, D L  determined that the Hudsons had in fact retained littoral rights to their portion of 
Government Lot 2 and issued the requested permit. 
In fact, over the 55+ years that followed completion of the improvements authorized by the 
1940 Smith Right-of-way Deed, two (2) encroachments have been specifically authorized on the 
Respondents' portion of Government Lot 2, one on the Hudson portion, and numerous 
encroachments on the Beach HouseISilver Beach Marina portion. In 2006, the Carrs lawfully platted 
their portion of Government Lot 2 into three lots. Amended AR at Ex. 10, p. 130. Lot 3 is owned 
by Lake CDA Investments. Lot 2 is owned by Keenan. Apparently, ITD and D L  claim that the only 
portions of Government Lot 3 that didnot retain littoral rights following executionofthe 1940 Smith 
Right-of-way Deed are the portions owned by Respondents Lake CDA Investments and Keenan. 
Not surprisingly, neither ITD nor D L  offer factual or legal authority sufficient to distinguish the 
Lake CDA InvestmentsKeenan properties from the other properties included in Government Lot 2, 
including the Carr and Hudson properties.1° 
The legal effect of the facts described herein, and the irrationality of the conduct of ITD and 
D L  in light of the same, was not lost on the District Court. The District Court, after conducting a 
thorough analysis of the facts and case law from Idaho and numerous other states, concluded that the 
Respondents' properties retained littoral rights based on the following record facts: 
(1) The expressed language of the 1940 Smith Right-of-way Deed limits its 
purpose to "a right for a public highway"; 
(2) The 1940 Smith Right-of-way Deed is silent as to littoral rights; 
(3) The subject properties of Respondents were originally part of a government 
lot, as were the properties of Hudson, Carr, and the Beach HouseISilver 
Beach Marina; 
(4) At the time the 1940 Smith Right-of-way Deed was executed, and extending 
through 1953, the then-existing variant of LC. 539-301 mandated that by 
accepting land for a highway, the public only acquired a "right-of-way" and 
not fee simple; and 
(5) The actions of ITD and D L  from 1940 through the present belied their claim 
that the Respondents' properties possessed no littoral rights. 
'O Apparently, ITD and D L  claim that littoral rights on the same government lot can 
be parceled out depending on who makes the application. Since a government lot is intended to 
convey title to the ordinary high water mark (OHWM), how exactly is it that the same government 
lot can have littoral rights on both ends (the Hudson and Carr properties) but none in the middle (the 
Lake CDA Investmenls and Keenan properties)? The Argument now advanced by ITD and D L  is 
not only incredible, it flies in the face of prior pronouncements by ITD as to this very geographic 
area. In 1995, ITD's district engineer admitted: 
[Tlhe Department has no objection to Idaho Department of Lands issuing dock 
permits on this section [Silver Beach] of roadway for those private properties where 
there is evidence that the property lines originally extended to the lakeshore and 
riparian rights exist. These are properties across which the ITD now holds an 
easement for the old highway. 
Amended AR at p. 4 
CR, Vol. 11, p. 325. It is not surprising then that the District Court concluded that, given IDL's 
approval of the Hudson application mere months before the submittal of the Respondents' 
applications, that DL'S actions as to Respondents were "arbitrary, capricious, [and] an abuse of 
discretion" under I.C. $67-5279. CR, Vol. D, pp. 34-35. 
C. The District Court Correctly Determined that IDL Erred, as a Matter of Law, 
by Finding that the Respondents' Properties Retained no Littoral Rights 
Following Execution of the 1940 Smith "Right-of-way Deed." 
1. The Extent of ITD's Interest Under the 1940 Smith "Right-of-Way 
Deed" is Determined by State Law. 
The Smith Right-of-way Deed upon which ITD relies was granted in 1940. The variant of 
Idaho Code $39-301 in effect at the time statutorily defined the nature of ITD's interest as a mere 
easement. Before the Respondents had submitted their respective applications, ITD itself 
acknowledged that it held nothing more than an easement. AR at pp. 15-16. Further, until the 
Respondents' applications were filed, ITD had long acknowledged the Respondents' retained littoral 
rights. "[Tlhe Department has no objection to Idaho Department of Lands issuing dock permits on 
this section of roadway for those private properties where there is evidence that the property lines 
originally extended to the lakeshore and riparian rights exist." AR at p. 4 (emphasis added). 
2. A Specific Easement for a Right-of-way Does Not Include the Servient 
Owners' Retained Littoral Rights. 
Under Idaho law, "It is well established ... that an easement is the right to use the land of 
another for a specific purpose." McKavv. Boise Proiect Board of Control, 141 Idaho 463,471,111 
P.3d 148 (2005). Every easement "is a particular easement, privileging the owner thereof to make 
particular uses of the servient estate." Id. 
Under Idaho law, the use of the term "right-of-way," in the substantive part of a deed, creates 
an easement, and not a transfer in fee simple. Hash v. U.S., 403 F.3d 1308 (C.A. Fed. Idaho (2005)). 
An easement does not include the right to enlarge the use to the injury of the servient land. 
v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46,74 P.2d 950 (Ct. App. 1985). 
The 1940 deed at issue specifically provides that it is for a "right-of-way." So too do the two 
(2) predecessor deeds. Amended AR at Exs. 2 and 3, pp. 110-15. Moreover, the deeds specifically 
acknowledge the littoral nature of the properties which they burdened. JcJ. It is self-evident that they 
did not include any right of control over the Respondents' littoral rights given that the authorized 
and/or unauthorized improvements constructed pursuant thereto were documented by "as-built" 
drawings that verified the continued location and maintenance of a "boat dock." Amended AR at 
Ex. S, p. 44. Coupled with the "as-builts" are 60 years of subsequent maintenance of a boat dock 
on the same property from which the Respondents' parcels were subdivided. 
Moreover, ITD, as the beneficial owner of an easement, could not enlarge the easement to 
the injury of the servient estate. Menill v. Penrod, m. Any authorization to ITD to construct the 
necessary improvements (including fill) required for the stability of the road did not (and could not) 
authorize an expansion of that right so as to usurp, obtain, or preempt the Respondents' underlying 
littoral rights. Any argument to the contrary is simply unsupported by the factual history applicable 
to these parcels and by Idaho law. 
In Akers v. D.L. White Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005), this Court 
again reaffirmed long-standing law which is particularly applicable here. 
An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not 
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner. 
Akers v. D.L. White Construction. Inc., 142 Idaho at 301 (citing Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 
229, 76 P.3d 969 (2003)). Such is the case here. A right-of-way deed, limited in scope, cannot 
somehow be expanded to subsume littoral rights which have absolutely nothing to do with the nature 
of the right defined in the an easement. 
3. The Respondents' Retained Littoral Rights Included theRight to Wharf 
Out. 
Idaho law makes clear that littoral rights include the fundamental right of the landowner to 
maintain his or her adjacency to the waterway. Brett v. Eleventh Street Dock Owners Association, 
141 Idaho 517, 521, 112 P.3d 80.5 (2005). Littoral rights also include the right to build "aids to 
navigation." I.C. $58-1302(f). 
4. The Circumstances Surrounding the Parties' Historic Intentions 
Confirm that Respondents' Properties Retain Littoral Rights. 
In the event that the subject Right-of-way Deed is ambiguous (a point not conceded), then 
the instrument is to be construed in connection with the intention of the parties and the circumstances 
in existence at the time the easement was given and canied out. Akers v. D. L. White Construction, 
Inc., 142 Idaho at 304. The question is easily resolved here. ITD's actual "as-built" drawings, 
prepared after completion of the improvements authorized by the 1940 Deed, confirmed the 
continued coexistence of a "boat dock." Amended AR at Ex. S, p. 44. Moreover, IDL's subsequent 
reauthorization of encroachments, including encroachments on the very parcels at issue here, with 
no objection from ITD, conclusively negates ITD's present contention that it somehow acquired the 
Respondents' littoral rights through delivery of the 1940 Deed. 
5. The District Court Correctly Determined that IDL Erred, as a Matter of 
Law, by Concluding that Respondents' Retained no Littoral Rights. 
a. IDL Had Jurisdiction to Determine, in the Context of 
Respondents' Applications, the nature of Respondents' Littoral 
Rights. 
DL, on appeal and for the first time in this proceeding, intimates that it did not have 
authority to determine the nature of Respondents' littoral rights for purposes of processing the 
subject applications. See DL'S Opening Brief at pp. 27-28. This contention is baseless. 
Issuance of a lake encroachment permit, i.e., permission to place a dock on the lake, 
necessarily contemplates a determination of littoral rights as defined by the Idaho 
Lake Protection Act. 
Brett v. Eleventh Street Dock Owners Association, 141 Idaho at 521. 
b. The District Court Correctly Determined that the Hearing 
Examiner's Reliance Upon Bowman v. McGoldrick Lumber 
Company Was Erroneous as a Matter of Law. 
DL'S Hearing Examiner concluded, as a matter of law, that, "It is established precedent in 
Idaho that a right-of-way deed can sever riparian rights." CR, Vol. I at p. 31 (citing Bowman v. 
McGoldrick Lumber Company, 39 Idaho 30,219 P. 1063 (1923)). The District Court correctly 
concluded that the Hearing Examiner erred as amatter of law. The arguments now advanced by ITD 
to the contrary are unavailing. 
This case deals with an easement arising under State law as it existed prior to 1953. 
Although denominated a "right-of-way deed," the instrument conveys no title greater than an 
easement for the limited purposes expressed therein. It is to be construedunder Idaho law applicable 
to easements. It cannot be expanded to subsume other uses. It has no attributes of a fee interest. 
To the contrary, in Bowman v. McGoldrick, m, this Court dealt with a railroad right-of-way that 
was held to have severed the burdened properties' littoral rights. However, the Hearing Examiner 
in this case clearly erred, as amatter of law, and the District Court so held, by failing to acknowledge 
or recognize the differing statutory attributes of a federal railroad right-of-way from a m  highway 
right-of-way. As noted, the latter is an easement. As set forth in Bowman v. McGoldrick, the 
former, a creature of federal statute, has the attributes of a fee interest and "is more than a mere 
easement." Bowman v. McGoldrick, 38 Idaho at 33,219 P. at 1064. 
The Hearing Examiner's erroneous construction of Bowman was not lost upon the District 
Court: 
This Court agrees with the landowners that "the Hearing Examiner wholly misread 
and expanded [the] Bowman decision." .... Bowman concerned a federal railroad 
right-of-way (not a state highway right-of-way), and as noted right inBowman by the 
Idaho Supreme Court, a federal railroad right-of-way is more than a mere easement 
and has the attributes of a fee interest! The Idaho Supreme Court in Bowman, citing 
Oregon Short Line R.R. Comvanv v. Stalker, 14 Idaho 371, 390, 94 P. 59 (1908) 
wrote: 
There [referring toK.& T. Ry, Companvv. Roberts, 152 U.S. 114,14 
S. Ct. 496,38 L. Ed. 377 (it is held that such grants) from the federal statute 
3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 511,30 Stat. at Large 990 (U.S. Comp. St. §§4181-4188) 
[have the 'attributes of the fee, perpetuity and exclusive use and 
possession'.] ... Under said decision it is apparent that the nature of the grant 
made in this case as to the right-of-way and station grounds is a base, 
qualified, or limited fee and is more than a mere easement, giving the 
exclusive possession and right of the use of the land for the purposes 
contemplated by the law; 
38 Idaho 30,33,219P. 1063 (64) (emphasis addedby theDistrict Court). Incredibly, 
the ITD claims in its brief, the situation of Bowman ". .. is verv similar to the situation 
at, where the undisputed evidence shows that ITD has obtained a right-of-way 
that extends waterward from the upland property, and that the current road is 
constructed on fill or near the edge of the upland property and to the lake." 
(Emphasis added) .... The situation in Bowman is not even remotely similar. In 
Bowman, the railroad's right-of-way was a from an act of Conmess of the 
United States, and that g.rant was given to the railroad before Bertha Bowman 
received her patent from the government for her property. 
CR, Vol. II, pp. 331-32 (emphasis supplied by the District Court). 
On appeal, ITD offers no cogent authority to support a conclusion, as a matter of law, other 
than that reached by the District Court and this Court in Bowman. ITD essentially posits that its 
easement should be analogized to a federal railroad easement, possessing the attributes of a fee 
interest. Yet ITD conveniently ignores the limitations contained in Idaho Code 539-301 prior to 
March 4,1953 60 years of acquiescence in and to the right of the Respondents' predecessors-in- 
title to maintain encroachments waterward of the very properties now at issue. 
The case of West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 554, 511 P.2d 1326 (1973) is perhaps more 
instructive. In West v. Smith, Kootenai County acquired a road right-of-way upon West's property 
by prescription. 95 Idaho at 555. Smith maintained a houseboat moored to pilings driven in the lake 
bed adjacent to the terminus oftheright-of-way, with agangplank accessing the shore. West brought 
suit seeking removal of Smith's houseboat. 
This Court affirmed the trail court's ruling that the littoral owner whose property was 
burdened by the right-of-way easement, even though it extended to the shore, retained the right of 
access to the lake "free from unreasonable interference." 95 Idaho at 555. The case did not 
specifically deal with any other littoral right, although it implicitly acknowledged that West would 
otherwise retain the littoral right to wharf out. Specifically, this Courl found that Smith's 
maintenance of a gangplank to the shore would otherwise interfere with the littoral rights maintained 
by West. 
The case supports the proposition that parties (such as the Respondents), who own fee title 
to littoral land by a right-of-way easement, retain the littoral rights that make their property unique. 
What makes this result particularly appropriate here is the fact that the improvements made by ITD, 
pursuant to a right-of-way easement, were acknowledged by prior ITD representatives to be limited 
to such a degree as to constitute some sort of usurpation of the Respondents' retained littoral 
rights. The right-of-way in West v. Smith arose under Idaho law. The right-of-way in Bowman v. 
McGoldrick arose under federal law. To the extent there is a conflict between the two cases, the 
holding in West v. Smith applies. This distinction was properly noted by the District Court which 
determined that West v. Smith was instructive as to the facts at bar. CR, Vol. II, pp. 3 10-1 1. 
c. The District Court Properly Determined That the Hearing 
Examiner Erred by Creating a "Subordination" of Littoral 
Rights Doctrine. 
The Hearing Examiner concluded that following delivery of the 1940 Right-of-way Deed, 
the Respondents' predecessors-in-interest had "subordinated" their littoral rights to ITD's right-of- 
way. "When that subordination occurred [in 19401, the [Respondents'] property lost those parts of 
their littoral rights which support the ability to wharf out." CR, Vol. I, p. 33. Alternatively stated, 
ITD claims that the Respondents' predecessors-in-title "implicitly dedicated" their littoral rights to 
the public. ITD offered the District Court no cogent legal authority for this proposition and the Court 
so held: 
ITD argues: "The easement acquired by ITD for the highway in question in 1940 
included an implied dedication of littoral rights to the public." .... There is no citation 
to any case or statute given for this bald claim by ITD. [Sluch a claim of "implied 
dedication of littoral rights to the public" is directly contrary to the Idaho Supreme 
Court case of West v. Smith, ... and contrary to all case law this Court has been able 
to find from other jurisdictions [citing authorities from New York, Wisconsin, 
California, Connecticut, Washington, and Maryland]. There simply'is no implied 
dedication of littoral rights to the public. 
CR, Vol. II at p. 333. ITD has still failed to offer any cogent authority contrary to the District 
Court's legal conclusion. 
D. The Ownership Issue as to Fill Placed Outside the Easement Area by ITD is 
Irrelevant. 
ITD concedes that the issue concerning ownership of fill placed outside of the specifically 
defined ITD easement area is irrelevant. "[Wlhether Keenan and Lake CDA own the fill placed by 
the State into Lake Coeur d'Alene to build the highway right-of-way is of no significance." 
ITD's Opening Brief at p. 38. Nor does ITD claim that Respondents have no right of access to the 
lake regardless of the ownership of any such fill. "ITD has no objection to [Respondents] exercising 
their right of access to the lake at this point." CR, Vol. I, p. 175. The only issue with respect to the 
fill is whether ITD, as the benefitted party under aright-of-way easement across littoral property, can 
effectively "confiscate" the servient owner's littoral rights by placing fill outside of the authorized 
easement area, and effectively landlocking the littoral parcel. 
The District Court properly concluded, as amatter oflaw, that the Respondents retained their 
littoral rights regardless of ITD's placement of fill waterward of, and outside of, the authorized 
easement area. The Court's conclusion was based in part on the following factors: 
(1) The subject Right-of-way Deed was for one purpose only "a right-of-way for 
a public highway." It was silent as to littoral rights; 
(2) ITD could not unilaterally enlarge the easement area to the damage of the 
servient landowners; 
(3) ITD could not enlarge the authorized uses under the easement to the damage 
of the servient landowners; and 
(4) The actions of ITD and IDL following construction of the improvements 
authorized by the 1940 Right-of-way Deed were directly contrary to the 
position they now advance. These actions include the preparation oras-built 
drawings" (Ex. S) showing the coexistence of a dock on this very property 
following construction of the improvements; the existence of a dock on the 
subject property for the better part of 60 years; subsequent the reauthorization 
of that dock on no less than two separate occasions through IDL with no 
objection by ITD; and the authorization of a dock on the adjacent parcel (the 
Hudson parcel) which, together with the Respondents' properties, were 
originally part of the same "parent parcel" (Government Lot 2). 
The District Court's conclusion was also supported in law. The Court undertook an 
extensive analysis of legal authorities from amultitude of other jurisdictions, all ofwhich supported 
the conclusion that "the State of Idaho placing fill in Lake Coeur d'Alene at the landowners' 
shoreline boundary has no effect on the landowners' littoral rights." CR, Vol. 11, pp. 325-31. ITD 
and D L  argue that the District Court had no jurisdiction to determine ownership of any such 
unauthorized fill." The jurisdictional issue is irrelevant. Both IDL, and the District Court on appeal, 
had jurisdiction to determine the nature and extent of Respondents' littoral rights. Brett v. 
Eleventh Street Dock Owners Association, 141 Idaho at 521. That is exactly what the Court did. 
It determined, based upon the undisputed record facts, as summarized above, and the considerable 
weight of analogous legal authority, that the Respondents' littoral rights had not been confiscated, 
implicitly dedicated, or subordinated by the placement of fill in violation of the terms of the 
easement. 
E. ITD is Estopped to Claim that its Own Permitting Process has any Relevance 
to the Encroachment Permit Sought from IDL. 
Both ITD and IDL claim that Respondents cannot make use of the requested encroachments 
without obtaining a separate right-of-way encroachment permit from ITD. Presumably, it is the 
Appellants' position that the Respondents need permission from ITD to cross artificial fill 
impermissibly placed by ITD between the Respondents' original littoral boundaries and the current 
boundaries. This contention is baseless. ITD itself has admitted, in these very proceedings, that it 
I 1  The District Court did observe that the artificial fill would inure to the benefit of the 
Respondents based upon prevailing authorities: "These cases correctly announce the law ... that 
when artificial accretions are cast upon the land of the landowner by either the Corps. of Engineers 
or some stranger without the intervention of the upland owner such artificial accretion inures to the 
title of the upland owner." CR, Vol. 11, p. 329 (citing H. K. Porter Company. Inc. v. Board of 
Supervisors of Jackson County, 324 So.2d 746, 750 (Miss. 1975) (additional citations omitted). 
Otherwise, the littoral landowner could effectively be "landlocked" and unable to exercise the 
control aspect of his or her littoral property. 
"has no objection to [Respondents] exercising their right of access to the Lake ...." CR, Vol. I, p. 
175. ITD is now estopped to claim otherwise. 
Moreover, even if such a permit requirement could be validly imposed, the requirement only 
applies to "structures" or "obstructions" placed on the right-of-way. See, ex., State ex. rel. Burns 
v. Kelly, 89 Idaho 139, 146-47, 403 P.2d 566 (1965). See also IDAPA 39.03.42.200.01. 
Respondents have proposed no encroachments of any significance on any authorized portion of the 
ITD right-of-way as defined by the easement. 
In rejoinder, ITD claims that it can do anything it wants with the right-of-way road prism, 
regardless of whether or not it is located within the authorized easement area. ITD relies, invariably, 
on various authorities, including Idaho Code and Idaho ~drninistrative ~egu1ations.l~ These citations 
are of no moment. 
First, they were all promulgated after the granting of the 1940 easement to ITD. There is no 
authority that would allow ITD to unilaterally change private property rights, created by contractual 
agreements, through legislative or administrative fiat. Second, if said authorities pertain, they do not 
grant ITD jurisdiction or authority over encroachments on the water. See, ex., Ritter v. Standal, 98 
Idaho 446,556 P.2d 769 (1977). Idaho Attorney General Opinion 83-6 (Although authorized 
generally to establish zoning ordinances under the Local Planning Act, a county is preempted from 
regulating lakeencroachments by the Lake Protection Act). 
ITD, joined by DL,  argued that the proposed encroachments (to wit, floating docks 
waterward of the OHWM) would interfere with the "integrity" of the road prism. The District Court 
'' The cited authorities are Idaho Code $340-310(9) and (1); 40-313(2); and DAPA 
39.03.42. 
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properly concluded that this argument bordered on the absurd and was unsupported by substantial 
evidence viewing the record as a whole. 
The two applications sought approval of encroachments extendingwatenvard of the OHWM. 
AR, pp. 19,70. The proposed encroachments have nothing more than a de minimis "contact" with 
any portion of the road prism or right-of-way. Does ITD really contend that a road prism intended 
to support a former interstate transportation system will actually be degraded or compromised 
because less than one foot of docking touches the watenvard extension of the same at the presumed 
ordinary high water mark? In fact, the utter speciousness of this claim is undermined by the fact that 
no less than 30 other private encroachments are located in a similar manner up and down Lake Coeur 
d'Alene Drive. Immediately to the north of the Respondents' properties lies a significant 
commercial establishment, with one ofthe largest privately-maintained marinas on the Lake, as well 
as a gargantuan condominium complex, all authorized in remarkably close proximity to the northern 
extension of the prism. Amended AR at p. 186. Immediately to the south is a private encroachment 
authorized by IDLmere months before these applications were submitted. Apparently, IDL and ITD 
claim that the & encroachments that could interfere with this expanse of road prism are the six to 
12 inches of access planking to the requested docks. The claim that these two de minimis access 
plankings would interfere with ITD's road prism underscores the arbitrary and capricious nature of 
the agency action given the prior approvals for 30 docks on neighboring portions of the purported 
"prism." 
F. The "Most Unusual of Circumstances" Prong of I.C. $58-1305(a)is 
Inapplicable. 
LC. $58-1 305(a) provides, inter alia, that applications for residential docks on waters abutting 
littoral properties shall not be denied "except in the most unusual of circumstances ...." IDL argues 
that the requested permits were properly denied based upon the "most unusual of circumstances" 
prong of 558-1 305(a). This argument is specious. 
First, the Hearing Examiner's twelve (12) page Recommendation neither mentions nor 
discusses "the most unusual of circumstances" prong. CR, Vol. I, pp. 23-34. Simply put, whether 
or not the requested encroachments were "the most unusual" was not an issue argued to the Hearing 
Examiner by D L  or ITD and IDL's attempt to now interject the issue in the case is untimely and 
unmerited. 
Second, even if the concept was applicable, despite IDL's procedural infirmities, what 
precisely makes these encroachments any more "unt~snal" than the 30 neighboring private docks that 
D L  has authorized along the same expanse ofpurported right-of-way or road "prism"? What makes 
this encroachment any more unusual than the StranahanICarr encroachment which IDL authorized 
on the very property from which the Respondents' lots were subdivided? 
IDL responds that the "most unusual of circumstances" arose "when ITD intervened in the 
permit application proceedings" claiming, inter alia, that ITD "held the littoral rights according to 
the application." See IDL's Opening Brief at p. 6. This assertion is somewhat disingenuous given 
that IDL, mere months before these applications were submitted, foundnothing "unusual" about the 
Hudson application, next door to the Lake CDA Investments' property, and issued the requested 
encroachment permit over ITD's objection. 
G. ITD Lacks Standing to Object. 
ITD had no standing to participate in proceedings below given its Iack of ownership of 
adjacent property with littoral rights & given the untimeliness of its objections. Pursuant to LC. 
558-1305, an application for a single-family encroachment permit "shall be processed by the Board 
with a minimum of procedural requirements and shall not be denied nor appearance required" except 
in the most unusual of circumstances or if the proposed encroachment infringes upon the "littoral 
rights of an adjacent property owner." ITD owns no property adjacent to either Respondent that 
includes littoral rights. ITD had no statutory basis to object to either application. 
D L  argues that ITD had standing due to "the most unusual of circumstances." However, as 
noted above, "unusual circumstances" was an issue that played no role in these administrative 
proceedings. It did not form the basis for the notice, it was not discussed by the Hearing Examiner, 
and the Hearing Examiner's report does not reference the same. 
Second, as to timing, $58-130501) provides: "The application itself shall be deemed 
sufficient notice if the adjacent owner is the State of Idaho." Since ITD alleges it owns the road 
right-of-way, adjacent to the Respondents' parcels, then for the sake of argument the submittal of 
the application constituted de facto notice of the same to ITD. 
Section 58-1305(b) requires the adiacent littoral owner to object within ten (10) days after 
notice of an application. Pursuant to DAPA 20.03.04.025.03, which conflicts with $58-1305@), 
the adjacent littoral owner has twenty-one (21) days within which to object. Notwithstanding the 
fact that ITD owns no adjacent property with littoral rights, and assuming (for the sake of argument) 
that it was entitled to object, ITD failed to timely do so under either the statutory or administrative 
standards cited. 
Lake CDA Investments' application was filed on July 31,2006. AR, p. 17. Written notice 
of the application was provided to ITD on September 6,2006. @. at p. 48. ITD objected on October 
10,2006. @. at p. 53. ITD's objection came thirty-four (34) days after DL'S notice, which, under 
the more liberal administrative standard (21 days), was thirteen (13) days too late. No hearing was 
necessary as ITD utterly failed to follow the requisite statutory & administrative procedures and 
deadlines. 
With respect to the Keenan application, filed onNovember 17,2006, there was objection 
by either adjacent littoral owner (Lake CDA Investments or Carr). Further, ITD's ostensible 
objection, although not made a part of the administrative record, was apparently dated January 8, 
2007. CR, Vol. I, p. 26. As with its objections to the Lake CDA Investments' application, ITD's 
objection to the Keenan application was patently untimely. Pursuant to 558-1305, the requested 
permits should have been issued, "with a minimum of procedural requirements" and no appearance 
should have been required. ITD waived any entitlement to object. 
H. ITD and IDL are Equitably Estopped to Deny that Respondents' Properties 
Retain the Littoral Right of Wharfage. 
Unlike equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel does not require as a necessary ingredient 
concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts. Sagewillow v. Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 845, 70 P.3d 669 (2003). Quasi-estoppel "applies when it would be 
unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right that is inconsistent with a prior position." Id. In 
light of these standards, the Court should consider the following. 
First, prior to the platting of Carr's Marina View Estates, the Carr, Keenan, and Lake CDA 
Investments properties were all part of one parcel. Second, the owners of those properties granted 
aright-of-way to the state. Third, the right-of-way was installed and drawings were prepared by ITD 
showing the improvements (Ex. S). Fourth, the improvements acknowledged the retained right of 
the servient owner to maintain a "boat dock." Fifth, that boat dock has remained in existence for 60 
years. Sixth, the boat dock has been repermitted on no less than two occasions. Seventh, the boat 
dock has remained in plain view of ITD and the public for 60 years and if ITD had an objection or 
claim that no littoral rights existed,one would have expected to hear of it. Eighth, the fact that the 
original parcel has been platted into three lots is of no legal significance in terms of littoral rights. 
How exactly is it that one part of the property can have littoral rights (the C a r  parcel (Lot 1)) and 
the remainder (Lots 2 and 3) do not? The problem is further compounded when both neighboring 
parcels (the BeachHouse and Hudsonparcels) are acknowledged by ITD to have littoral rights given 
the existence and perpetuation of encroachments in the waters abutting the same. Given the 
foregoing, it is plainly inequitable and unconscionable to allow ITD to disavow its prior 
acknowledgment of the continued existence and retention of Respondents' littoral rights." 
I. The District Court Properly Awarded Respondents Attorney Fees. 
On March 24, 2008, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision. On March 28, 
2008, Respondents filed their Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. a. at p. 336. Respondents 
sought an award of fees under LC. $12-1 17. ITD and IDLobjected and separately moved to disallow 
Respondents' claims. Id. at pp. 352 (ITD) and 365 (IDL). On May 6, 2008, Respondents filed a 
Supplemental Affidavit of Costs and Fees (CR, Vol. 11, p. 406), adding to their claim $1,282.50 in 
j3 The inequity of the Appellants' positions is M h e r  underscored by admissions and 
acknowledgments contained in a 1990 communication to IDL from ITD's then-District engineer. 
CR, Vol. I, pp. 115-16. Respondents moved the District Court for leave to supplement the record 
with the cited correspondence given that its existence was not made known to Respondents until 
after the Hearing Examiner had ruled. Id. at pp. 11 1-19. Although the referenced 1990 document 
is not essential to this Court's affirmance of the District Court's decision, the document nonetheless 
underscores the inequity of these agencies' conduct. While acknowledging that "it's a close call," 
the District Court nonetheless erred in excluding the property document. Tr., pp. 11-13. 
Nonetheless, given that they are public agencies, and, as IDL has claimed, "neutral," it defies reason 
why these agencies would object to the Court's consideration of the truth. 
fees incurred following the filing of the initial fee request of March 28,2008. 
OnMay 20,2008, the Court grantedRespondentsY fee request. @. at pp. 418-424. The Court 
denied the request of ITD and D L  to strike the Respondents' Supplemental Affidavit of Fees (filed 
May 6,2008), thereby granting the fee request in total under the authority of LC. 5 12-1 17. @. The 
Court specifically found that the positions advanced by ITD and IDL before the Court, as well as the 
positions advanced by ITD before IDL, were unsupported in fact and in law. The Court further 
found that IDL's administrative decision was arbitrary and capricious and constituted an abuse of 
discretion. @. 
LC. 5 12-1 17 "is not discretionarybut provides that the Court must award attorney fees where 
a state agency did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law in a proceeding involving a person 
who prevails in the action." Fischer v. Citv of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 355-56, 109 P.3d 1091 
(2005). 
By now this Court has a full grasp of the factual and procedural background to this appeal. 
Suffice to say that ITD acknowledged the littoral rights of Respondents' predecessor-in-title in the 
1940s, after constructing the improvements ostensibly authorizedunder the Right-of-way Deed, and 
for 60 years thereafter. These acknowledgments included the dock in place as shown on the "as- 
built" drawings, the dock put in by Stranahan, the repermitted dock of Stranahan, and the dock put 
in by Carr. ITD made no claim of littoral rights. The same holds true with respect to the 30 other 
families who have neighboring docks, including the Hudsons. 
ITD argued that the littoral rights of these Respondents, as contrasted to any of the other 30 
dock owners (including the Hudsons who live next door), had been "implicitly dedicated," 
"subordinated," or otherwise with virtually no supporting legal authority under Idaho law. In fact, 
ITD's position ran directly afoul of instructions given by its District engineer to IDL in 1995. AR 
at p. 4. 
As for DL,  it claims not to have acted as "an adversary" to Respondents. We could all have 
such good friends. IDL actually adopted the arguments of ITD and advanced the same to the District 
Court. IDLrequired that the Respondents participate in hearings althoughno timely objections were 
made, as required by LC. $58-1305, by adjacent owners of littoral rights. 
On appeal, IDL claims that a hearing was required because of the "most unusual of 
circumstances." Yet IDLnever providednotice of that at any point in time during the administrative 
process. Moreover, D L  can't show why the proposed encroachments are any moreunusual than the 
encroachment IDL authorized on the adjacent property mere months before these applications were 
submitted. In fact, it was action of this nature that led the District Court to conclude that IDL had 
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The District Court's decision was sound and should be 
affirmed. 
Finally, both agencies object to the timeliness of the Respondents' Supplemental Affidavit 
of Fees (filed May 6,  2008). The agencies' argument constitutes nothing more than a tortured 
reading of the rules and case law. IRCP 54(d)(5) provides that a memorandum of costs and fees 
must be filed within fourteen (14) days after enhy of judgment. The Respondents' Memorandum 
of Costs and Fees was initially filed four days after the Memorandum Decision and prior to the entry 
of any monetaryjudgment. The Respondents thereafter filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Costs 
to include, inter alia, the time in responding to the agencies' objections to the request for fees. This 
was an initial Memorandum of Costs, but, rather, one to amend and supplement the costs timely 
asserted before any monetary judgment on the same had been entered. To accept the position 
advanced by the agencies would mean that no party, with a statutory basis for recovering fees, could 
recover any fees incurred more than fourteen (14) days after entry of a judicial decision but prior to 
entry of a monetary award on the fees. Respondents respectfully request that this is not the law of 
Idaho.14 
J. Respondents Seek an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal Pursuant to 1.C. 512- 
117. 
Respondents submit to this Court, as they did to the District Court, that D L  and lDT have 
proceeded without a reasonable basis in fact. This much is evident from the parties' course of 
conduct for the near 70 years following the granting of the 1940 Right-of-way Deed. It is also 
submitted that the agencies acted without a reasonable basis in law given their advancement of a 
theory of "implied dedication" or "subordination" of littoral rights with no accompanying case law. 
In any event, those legal authorities were advanced in direct conflict to the undisputed facts that 
would otherwise seem to estop both agencies from asserting that Respondents possess no littoral 
rights. Respondents are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to LC. 
9 12-1 17, for the additional reasons advanced in the context of the discussion of the propriety of the 
attorney fee award by the District Court as set forth above. 
1V. CONCLUSION. 
Basedupon the reasons and authorities set forth above, Respondents respectfully request that 
the District Court's "Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal" be affirmed, in its entirety, and 
l4 The caseofAllisonv. JohnM. Bisgs, Inc., 121 Idaho 567,826 P.2d 916 (1992), cited 
by both agencies, is not dispositive. In that case, an award of fees was sought after entry of the 
monetary judgment that included the initial fee award. The Court held that LC. 5 12-120(3) did not 
form a basis for such an award of fees and, in any event, the request was made more than fourteen 
(14) days after entry of the monetary judgment that awarded the fees in the first instance. Such is 
not the case at bar. 
that Respondents recover their attorney fees and costs as incurredon appeal pursuant to LC. $12-1 17. 
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Dated this L 2 a y  of June, 2009. 
Respondents w 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certifl that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 
following, as indicated, this f i  day of June, 2009: 
Chris Kronberg, Deputy Attorney General - U.S. MAIL 
Idaho Transportation Department - HAND DELIVERED 
33 11 W. State Street X OVERNIGHT MAIL 
P.O. Box 7129 - FACSIMILE (2081334-4498) 
Boise, ID 83707 
David Stanish, Deputy Attorney General U.S. MAIL 
Natural Resources Division HAND DELIVERED 
P.O. Box 83720 X OVERNIGHT MAIL 
Boise, ID 83720-0050 FACSIMILE (2081854-8072) 
Thomas and Rebecca Hudson 
1835 S. Silver Beach Road 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-7531 
U.S. MAIL 
- HAND DELIVERED 
- OVERNIGHT MAIL 
- FACSIMILE 
INDEX TO ADDENDA TO RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NO. - DESCRIPTION 
1 An illustrative aerial photograph showing the location of the tlvee (3) parcels 
created by the Carrs' Marina View Estates Plat (Addenda No. 6). 
2 A copy of Exhibit 9 from the Agency Record on Appeal (Amended AR at Ex. 9, p. 
128). This is an aerial photograph that shows a wider view of the matters depicted 
in Addendum No. 1, as well asepicts the expanse of property between the 
Carr/Stranahan parcel (Lot 1) and the Hudson parcel. 
3 An additional aerial photograph taken from a higher vantage point. Addendum #3 
shows lhe area of shoreline from the Beach House Marina to and including 
- 
Bennett Bay. Along this strip, as shown in Addendum #3, are multiple private 
encroachments (docks) extending watenvard of Lake Coeur d'Alene Drive (former 
Interstate 90). The is included in the Amended AR at Ex. A, p. 5. 
4 A copy of Exhibit 26 (Amended AR at p. 183). This photograph shows the area in 
question in 1967. In the background is Potlatch Hill. The shoreline depicted 
includes the present location of a portion of the Beach House property and Lots 1 
(Carr), 2 (Keenan), and 3 (Lake CDA Investments) of Carrs' Marina View Estates. 
5 A copy of Exhibit 27 (Amended AR at p. 184). This consists of a contemporary 
photograph of the same area depicted in Exhibit 26. The photo was taken 
approximately one week prior to the March 2007 hearing date below. The 
photograph shows the pilings utilized by the Carr/Stranahan dock (also depicted in 
Addenda 1 and 2). Also depicted in the foreground are encroachments associated 
with the Hudsons' dock. Depicted in the background is a post-1967 bulkhead 
constructed on the Beach House side of Coeur d'Alene Lake Drive. 
6 A copy of Exhibit 10 (Amended AR at p. 130). Exhibit 10 is a reduced size copy 
of the first page of the Carrs' Marina View Estates Plat, showing the three lots 
created from the original CarrIStranahan parcel. These include Lot 1 (Carr), Lot 2 
(Keenan), and Lot 3 (Lake CDA Investments). 
7 An excerpt of Exhibit "S" (Amended AR at p.44). Exhibit "S' is a drawing 
produced by ITD showing improvements in place as authorized by and constructed 
under the applicable 1940 right-of-way easement (Amended AR at Ex. 4, p. 116). 
CARR-KEENAN ADDENDUM INDEX.wpd 
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